Standing, Rights, Democracy & the States
By Thomas Silverstein, President/Executive Director, Poverty & Race Research Action Council
In my own now (mostly) defunct career as an impact litigator, no doctrinal issue dominated my attention quite like standing. Just a few months into my tenure as a fellow at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, I was poking around the zoning regulations of some overwhelmingly white outer suburbs of a major midwestern city that applied large-lot, single-family zoning to larger proportions of their residential land (sometimes all) than I had previously seen. Our chief counsel was interested in seeing whether we could bring a challenge, and, not having taken Federal Courts while in law school, I had to teach myself the law of standing while exploring whether that would be viable or not. I came up quite violently against the rough shores of Warth v. Seldin. The answer was that our only pathway to the facts under which a plaintiff would plausibly be able to assert standing was if a developer with an interest in property in one of the towns proposed a rezoning and if the applicable municipality rejected that request. Since developers typically incur hundreds of thousands (and sometimes millions) of dollars in costs before they can even make such a request, that was simply not going to happen. We moved on.
About three years later, the wanton lawlessness of Secretary Ben Carson’s U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) during the first Trump Administration devoured my timesheets. I was involved in three Administrative Procedure Act (APA) lawsuits challenging various attacks on fair housing and civil rights: first to the suspension of the implementation of the Small Area Fair Market Rent (SAFMR) rule in 2017, then to the withdrawal of the local government assessment tool for the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing rule (effectively suspending the rule) in 2018, and lastly to the gutting of the disparate impact rule in 2020. It would be fair to say that standing – whether of directly harmed individuals, of membership associations, or of organizations whose own interests were impaired – was a major emphasis of our strategizing across all of these cases (in which PRRAC, before my time here, was also co-counsel). In the SAFMR case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.), on a preliminary injunction posture, did not address standing but held that our plaintiffs – the Connecticut Open Communities Alliance and two brave individual Housing Choice Voucher holders – had shown a likelihood that they would experience irreparable harm in the absence of interim relief, a strong indication that the Court would have found that they had standing had that been fully adjudicated at a later stage. In the disparate impact rule case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut never ruled on our plaintiffs’ standing because a preliminary injunction entered into in a sister case (the pending appeal of which the Biden Administration dropped upon taking office) obviated the need for it to do so.
However, I still wear the battle scars of National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) v. Carson. In August 2018, I, alongside co-counsel Sasha Samberg Champion (then of Relman & Colfax and now of NFHA), delivered the first major (and still the most major) argument of my legal career before the same D.D.C. judge who granted our preliminary injunction in the SAFMR case. It was a combined argument on our motion for preliminary injunction, HUD’s motion to dismiss, and the State of New York’s motions to intervene and for a preliminary injunction. Establishing that our plaintiffs – NFHA along with Texas Housers and Texas Appleseed – had standing was my remit. I remember the argument being long and arduous though I felt in the moment that I had good answers for Judge Beryl Howell’s questions and that our very extensive preparation had demonstrated its value. When argument concluded, I felt genuinely uncertain about what the outcome would be, but my colleagues reassured me. Some of that reassurance may have been grounded in the strength of our briefing and my argument performance, but a portion of it was also based on a firmer belief that the court would find that the State of New York had standing.
But, eight days later, we got the Court’s ruling back, and it was a defeat on standing grounds. It is not the purpose of this post to rehash the ins and outs of that decision, but there are two high-level takeaways (aside from my own second-guessing as to whether there is anything I might have done differently) that I derive from the experience. First, in light of the ways in which the federal courts have applied standing doctrine under the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution (regarding which: curious that standing doctrine came into its own during the Burger Court counterrevolution, following the rights expansion of the Warren Court and the passage of the legacy civil rights statutes, rather than, say, during the Lochner Era, when a different and reactionary set of property and contractual rights assertions from business interests gained traction with the Supreme Court!), it is not uncommon for major violations of federal law to occur for which there is no plaintiff that a court would find to have standing, even where Congress clearly intended for private attorneys general to play a role in effectuating its purpose.
Second, the organizational standing doctrine of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which presaged the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Food & Drug Admin. (FDA) v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, has exacerbated that problem. That body of case law has prevented expansive readings of the Supreme Court’s 1982 standing decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, instead looking for something very close to the ways in which the housing discrimination challenged by Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia (HOME of Virginia) in Havens made its tenant counseling more difficult by increasing the time and expense of providing those services to households whose searches would be extended due to unlawful refusals to rent.
I experienced this a second time, albeit in state court, in a case that I co-counseled with the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and in which I delivered my second and, to date, final major argument of my litigating career (along with my co-counsel Aneel Chablani): Grassroots Collaborative v. City of Chicago. This was a challenge, under both the Illinois Civil Rights Act and the state law authorizing but contouring the ability of municipalities to create tax increment financing (TIF) districts, to the designation of two very large TIFs in disproportionately white parts of Chicago. Although Article III does not limit the jurisdiction of the Illinois state courts and standing is supposed to be broader under Illinois law, the judge in Grassroots Collaborative rejected our plaintiffs’ standing on grounds very similar to what one might have expected from a D.D.C. judge applying D.C. Circuit law at that time or that one might expect from a federal district court judge applying FDA anywhere in the country today. The intermediate appellate court upheld that decision on appeal.
With Grassroots Collaborative, the thought that sticks with me today is not a doctrinal one but rather one about an underutilized opportunity to advance rights and justice through law reform at the state level. Although the decision in that case did not go our way and may have been wrong based on the law as it stood in Illinois at that time, it is also true that Illinoisans (and residents of other states) have the power to either clarify or change the law in order to prevent standing from being a significant barrier to the enforcement of rights. In a variety of states, organizers, advocates, and public interest litigators can – in a way that is not feasible at the federal level due to the difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution – mobilize to strengthen statutes to reflect the intended scope of statutory standing that legislatures are conferring in states where courts respect statutory standing. They can also (bypassing legislatures and going straight to the voters in some states) amend state constitutions to acknowledge state court jurisdiction over claims from plaintiffs with statutorily conferred standing (regardless of whether they have suffered something that looks like an Article III injury). Lastly, they can, through arguments presented in litigation, persuade state appellate courts to revisit previous decisions that have narrowed standing but that are not actually dictated by the provisions of state constitutions.
This is not rocket science. Most states already recognize standing in at least some circumstances where the federal courts would not. And, as an example that is more to the point, the D.C. Council conferred a private right of action to nonprofit organizations acting in the public interest for the enforcement of its Consumer Protection Procedures Act, and the D.C. Court of Appeals recognized the standing of an organization utilizing this private right of action without applying a stringent Article III-like test. Additional progressive jurisdictions could do this.
A structure in which state constitutions recognize the authority of legislatures to broaden the jurisdiction of state courts over rights-enforcing claims by statute is an appealing one for a few key reasons. First, we know that a litany of statutorily recognized rights – to not be subjected to discrimination or unfair and deceptive acts and practices, to safe and healthy homes and working conditions, to a clean environment, and more – are observed in the breach. Public enforcement does not occur at the scale needed to make these rights real, and procedural barriers impede complementary private enforcement. We should invest in public enforcement capacity, but, while we work to do so, the least that we could do is unshackle potential private attorneys general.
Second, although litigation-centric approaches to affecting societal transformation can be subject to critique as counter-majoritarian and therefore anti-democratic, the same is not true when democratic majorities have decided to create rights and have delegated roles in the process of enforcing those rights to both state courts and private attorneys general. In that scenario, broad standing and the aggressive use of the courts to enforce rights is actually majoritarian. If the residents of a state and their elected legislatures overwhelmingly support banning source of income discrimination in housing and perhaps also supported a state constitutional amendment to force state courts to recognize statutory conferrals of standing, democracy demands that we open the courthouse doors to private, nonprofit fair housing organizations seeking to enforce the right to be free from source of income discrimination even if those organizations’ facts do not exactly mirror those of HOME of Virginia in Havens.
Third, just because legislatures could choose to confer statutory standing, that does not mean that they would be required to do so. In the current context of cases like FDA and right-wing challenges to diversity, equity, and inclusion policies, progressives are well-aware that standing doctrine is often the easiest way to dispose to attempts to unravel rather than to strengthen rights. In deciding which substantive rights to attach statutory standing to and which classes of potential litigants to confer standing on, legislatures can be selective in ways that mitigate the potential for inadvertently seeding the conditions for attacks on societal progress. That selectivity should be exercised in ways that are viewpoint-neutral, but striking that balance is a manageable difficulty.
At PRRAC, we are not principally in the business of litigating rights-based claims, but supporting organized tenants and communities that are fighting to instantiate new rights in policy is our bread and butter. We have been at this the longest with respect to efforts to protect individuals and families with Housing Choice Vouchers from discrimination, but that is just one of many areas where state and local laws can advance racial and economic justice. Over the past couple of years, habitability issues in multifamily housing contributed to by unsustainable landlord debt service obligations have come to the fore as a priority issue for tenant unions. We know that, if enforcement of the right to safe and decent housing can only be done by individual tenants or by government agencies, many people will be left in the literal cold (because the heat does not work), inhaling mold spores, and protecting their children from disease-carrying rodents. But the types of organizations that can step in to supplement the enforcement of democratically enshrined rights to decent housing and to protection against source of income discrimination are precisely the types of organizations that may have difficulty establishing Article III standing in the present moment. That means that the time is right to strengthen these groups’ access to state courts. As an organization that is committed to ensuring that we are not achieving solely paper victories when we nominally expand rights, we hope to be a partner in efforts to do just that.
Discussion